LinkedIn Social Media Forensics on Windows 10

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Abstract

Many people have gradually changed their way of living habits on account of the great popularity progression of social networking sites. There are varied kinds of social networking sites coming out in recent years, for example, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, LinkedIn. Furthermore, social networking sites have already made people more convenient to make friends and communicate with each other much easier than before. However, there are some problems we should concern. Owing to the cyberworlds are flourishing, there are several kinds of crimes emerge in endlessly in recent years. This paper focuses on the digital forensics of LinkedIn by running on three different browsers, including Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, and Microsoft Edge. They are running respectively under windows 10 operating system. In our work, we strive to find digital evidences that user has been done on the computers. We make use of authoritative digital forensic tools to obtain significant evidences and analyze the correlation between these evidences in detail. Besides, we will find out which behaviors of the suspect will leave what kind of evidences on the computer. These findings could be important references for the law enforcement agency to investigate digital crime.

Keywords: Crime Investigation; Digital Forensics; LinkedIn; Social Media

1 Introduction

In recent years, the popularity of social networking sites has given rise to the number of social networking users for recreation and business purposes. A social network is a community where people across the globe world online that can develop a network with different individuals for a specific purpose [1]. Besides, the prevalence of these social networking websites has changed the living habits of many people. These people usually browse social networking sites to relieve their working pressure or any other kinds of pressures in their daily life.

People can make use of social networking sites to build up their profile. A profile is a list of identifying infor-

mation that can portray users' online identity, including photographs, name, birthday, hometown, personal interest and so on [9]. Furthermore, social networking sites can connect people and maintain relationships from all parts of their lives [6]. They can share everything with their friends on the websites. There is no doubt that people have incorporated social networking sites into their lives and made using social networking sites as frequent daily activities.

Due to the advance of technology, the type of crime is getting much more complex than before. At present, traditional crime is on the decrease. In other words, high technology crime is increasing nowadays. There are a lot of perpetrators using social networking sites to commit the cybercrime because of its convenience and anonymity characteristics. Therefore, the traditional crimes such as killing people, domestic violence, stealing and robbing are decreasing nowadays. On the contrary, computer crime and cybercrime have already become the mainstream of all the crimes. Cybercrime refers to a perpetrator that abused or destroyed a computer to commit a crime. Therefore, cybercrime is definitely different from traditional crime. The following shows the characteristics of cybercrime [7]:

- Making use of the computer characteristics to commit the crime.
- The high dark figure of crime.
- The time and dimension features between crime behaviors and crime results.
- Take a computer as a crime scene.
- Take a computer as a target.

Over the past 10 years, the terrorists use the Internet have become of great concern. The gang of terrorist has successfully used the Internet to enlarge their memberships [11]. This will cause widespread harm to Internet victims.

According to the survey of National Police Agency, Ministry of the Interior Republic of China, the statistics show the cybercrimes happened in Taiwan between January and June in 2017, there are 6,567 cybercrime cases occurred. The cybercrime ratio increases 4.39 percentages relative to the same period of last year. However, the perpetrators who are at the age of 18 to 23 called adolescents are increasing 28.07 percentages relative to the same period of last year. The victims who are more than 50 years old are increasing 43.54 percentages relative to the same period of last year [15]. Over the past few years, various kinds of cybercriminals have emerged endlessly due to the anonymity characteristic of the Internet. Therefore, anonymity is largely tied to the cybercrime nowadays. Moreover, it is also claimed that the anonymity characteristic allows perpetrators to use the Internet without the possibility of detection. Catherine D. Marcum, et al. categorized different types of social networking criminality, for instance, texting, identity theft, cyberbullying, digital piracy, sexual violence, and so forth [13]. Therefore, we can realize that social networking websites have seriously become a hotbed of cybercrimes based on these significant literatures. According to the survey of eBizMBA [10], popular social networking sites are prevalent nowadays, such as Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, Instagram, LinkedIn and so on. Many of them have over than 100 million members, a quite large number for the time.

This paper focuses on the digital forensics of LinkedIn by running on three different browsers, including Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox and Microsoft Edge. They are running respectively under windows 10 operating system. In our work, we strive to find digital evidences that user has been done on the computers. The results will be served as a reference for the future researchers in social network cybercrime investigation or digital forensics.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the related works. In Section 3, we introduce our investigation methodologies. In Section 4, we present results and findings of digital forensics on LinkedIn. Finally, we summarize the conclusions.

2 Related Works

2.1 LinkedIn Social Networking Site

LinkedIn is a business and employment-oriented service that operates via websites and mobile applications. It founded on December 28 in 2002 and launched on May 5 in 2003.

LinkedIn [19] is mainly used for professional networking, including employers posting jobs and job seekers posting their curriculum vitae. According to the survey of Alexa [2], LinkedIn was ranked 31st relative to other social networking websites in the world. As of April 2017, LinkedIn had 500 million members in 200 countries, out of which more than 106 million members are activities [12]. LinkedIn allows members to create profiles and connections to each other in an online social network that may represent real-world professional relationships. Members can invite anyone to become a connection [17]. Such dissemination of confidential information is possibly more likely concerning social networking applications such as LinkedIn where users may be actively looking for employment or maybe in contact with individuals from competitor organizations.

However, there are many kinds of literature focus on the forensic analysis of social networking sites nowadays. Azfar *et al.* [5] proposed the utility model for the evidence extraction of five social networking applications, including Twitter, POF Dating, Snapchat, Fling and Pinterest.

Neha [16] focused on the forensic analysis of WhatsApp application on storage devices and volatile memory. Mutawa *et al.* [14] focused on the forensic analysis of three popular social networking sites, including Facebook, Twitter, and Myspace. Dezfouli, *et al.* [8] examined four well-known social networking applications, Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, and Google+. They were able to recover artefacts, such as usernames, passwords, login information, personal information, posts, messages and comments from these social networking sites. However, they only focus on the mobile phone forensics for these four applications. They didn't perform computer forensics which refers to browser forensics for these four applications. As a result, we take the LinkedIn application as one of our experiment targets.

This paper studies the behavior of a user who log into LinkedIn from different browsers. We strive to extract the evidence of posts creation, making comments, chatting records, browsing behaviors, adding friends and so forth. All of these behaviors are conducted under Windows 10 operating system. Furthermore, this paper analyzes correlations between these evidences and discusses how these evidences can help law enforcement agencies to investigate a crime.

2.2 Tools

Due to the high dynamics and heterogeneity of social media, digital forensics can use different and complex software tools to conduct effective and legal evidence collection [3]. There are many forensic tools on the market today. The mainstream of digital forensic products such as Autopsy, Forensic Toolkit and EnCase forensic have support digital forensics. The study described in this paper has been executed by a series of processes. In the experiments, the hard disk and memory were examined to extract and analyze the data generated by LinkedIn website. With the advanced development of forensic tools, the forensic tools and techniques should keep investigators ahead of the criminals [18].

Arthur *et al.* [4] conducted an investigation into some of the forensic tools, including PC Inspector File Recovery, EnCase, Forensic Toolkit and FTK Imager. However, the main function of FTK Imager is to view and to image storage devices. In light of these advantages, we adopt AccessData FTK Imager V4.1.1 to create an image file for the hard disk. Forensic Toolkit is a computer forensics software made by AccessData. It scans a hard disk searching for various types of information. The toolkit comprises a standalone disk imaging program called FTK Imager. The FTK Imager is a simple tool that saves an image of a hard disk in a file. The result is an image file that can be saved in several formats.

On the other hand, there are many kinds of tools used for memory forensics nowadays. The manipulation of these memory forensic tools is roughly different, but the theorem concepts are the same. The goal of these tools is to read physical memory for the sake of achieving memory forensics. Therefore, this paper adopts the MANDIANT tool to create an image file for the memory. MANDI-ANT is an open source tool that can be downloaded on the Internet. There are a few basic functions describe as follows:

- MemoryDD.bat: This batch file is used to create an image file for volatile memory.
- Process.bat: This batch file is used to list all the running processes.
- DriverSearch.bat: This batch file is used to list which SYS file is loading on the computer.
- HookDetection.bat: This batch file is used to list which hooks file is executing on the computer.

In the experiment, in order not to influence the integrity of digital evidence, this paper makes use of MemoryDD.bat file to dump the memory for the sake of creating image files. Finally, this paper makes use of AccessData FTK Imager V4.1.1 to analyze all the image files which were generated by the previous processes. However, the most important of all is that we take another clean computer to analyze these image files.

In this paper, all the experiments were conducted on the real computer system. The computer system was installed Windows 10 professional 64-bit operating system. The central processing unit is Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-4790 CPU @ 3.60GHz. The memory size is 8 Gigabytes. This paper selects two common browsers, including Google Chrome V59.0.3071.115 and Microsoft Edge V 40.15063.0.0.

3 Methodology

3.1 Research Goal

The research described in this paper is done by a series of processes, each involving a specific scenario. In the experiment, we log into LinkedIn websites via three different browsers. All of these operations are executed under Windows 10 operating system. After login, we do a series of same behaviors, such as login account, adding friends, chatting with friends, writing posts, making comments, clicking the "Like" button. Afterward, we make use of Forensic Toolkit Imager to extract digital evidence of these behaviors left. Finally, we analyze and compare the difference between these digital evidences.

3.2 Experiment Elaboration

In order to ensure the integrity of digital evidence and avoid the interference between digital evidences, we separate the experiments into three scenarios according to the different browsers. We chose three clean computers and each of them was installed Windows 10 professional operating system. We did these three scenarios in different computer environments. They were not placed on the same computer system. Afterward, we performed a series of behaviors on the LinkedIn. The following shows the details for these three scenarios.

3.2.1 Scenario 1: Google Chrome

In scenario 1, all the operations were conducted via Google Chrome browser. We entered the personal account and password to log into the LinkedIn website. After log into the LinkedIn website, we created posts and uploaded the pictures. Moreover, we did a lot of users common activities, for example, adding friends, chatting with friends, making comments, clicking the "Like" button and so forth. After we did these user common activities, we didn't do anything anymore. We created image files for the hard disk and memory respectively. Thereafter, we adopted Forensic Toolkit Imager to extract and analyze the digital evidence.

3.2.2 Scenario 2: Mozilla Firefox

In scenario 2, all the operations were conducted via the Mozilla Firefox browser. We entered the personal account and password to log into the LinkedIn website. After login, we created posts and uploaded the pictures. Moreover, we did a lot of users common activities, for example, adding friends, chatting with friends, making comments, clicking the "Like" button and so forth. After we did these user common activities, we didn't do anything anymore. We created image files for the hard disk and memory respectively. Thereafter, we adopted Forensic Toolkit Imager to extract and analyze the digital evidence.

3.2.3 Scenario 3: Microsoft Edge

In scenario 3, all the operations were conducted via the Microsoft Edge browser. We entered the personal account and password to log into the LinkedIn website. After login, we created posts and uploaded the pictures. Moreover, we did a lot of users common activities, for example, adding friends, chatting with friends, making comments, clicking the "Like" button and so forth. After we did these user common activities, we didn't do anything anymore. We created image files for the hard disk and memory respectively. Thereafter, we adopted the Forensic Toolkit Imager to extract and analyze the digital evidence.

4 **Results and Findings**

We log into the LinkedIn website by entering the email account and password on the computer. Afterward, we execute a series of processes, such as creating posts, chatting with friends, making comments, adding friends. After executing these user common activities, we create image files for the hard disk and the memory. We separate analysis procedure into two parts, hard disk and memory. We make use of one practical function of FTK Imager to execute a quick search for the keyword. The following are our analyses and description of forensic results.

4.1

4.1.1Account and Password

In the hard disk, there are various kinds of evidence we can extract. First, we can find out user account information by searching the key string "www.linkedin.com". as shown in Figure 1. We can find two keywords in the context, there are "session_key" and "session_password". These two keywords reveal important information about the e-mail login account and password. However, we can't find password information because the text of password was garbled. We can't comprehend its meaning by our first intuition. Therefore, we infer that the password may be encrypted.

In the part of memory, we can only find an e-mail login account, but the password was garbled as well.

4.1.2Posting Evidence

Every posting has it's unique post ID. Post ID is a string of numbers. When a user writes a post on the feed, the system will automatically assign a unique ID to the posting, for example, "https:// www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity: 6378505126512074752/". We can easily realize the post ID is 6378505126512074752. Therefore, the posting network address is often built in the form of "https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity: Post ID". In the hard disk, by searching the key string "https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:", we can find creating evidence of posting, as shown in Figure 2. Therefore, we can match the post ID we found in the image file and the network address. If both of them are the same, we can definitely infer that they must have posted that article on the LinkedIn website in the past. Moreover, we also found post contents by searching the key string, as shown in Figure 3.

In the part of memory, we can also find creating evidence and posting contents by searching the key strings.

4.1.3Making Comment Evidence

LinkedIn allows any people to make any comments on any articles. In the hard disk, by searching the keyword "comment", we can find comment evidence that we made

on the other user's posting, as shown in Figure 4. On the other hand, by reverse searching the key string, we can find comment content, as shown in Figure 5.

In the part of memory, the situation is the same as in the hard disk, we can also find comment evidence and its content by searching the keyword and the key string.

Chatting Records 4.1.4

In the hard disk, we can extract chatting record evidence. When a user chatted with friends, the system will automatically record chat ID. Moreover, the network address of chatting page would Findings: Scenario 1: Google Chrome show friend's chat ID, for example, "https://www. linkedin.com/messaging/thread/63784999 18738399232". Therefore, we can easily realize that the majority of the chatting record network address is often built in the form of "https://www.linkedin.com/messaging/thread/Chat-By searching the key string "https://www. ID". linkedin.com/messaging/thread/", we can easily find the chatting record evidence, as shown in Figure 6. Furthermore, we can also find chatting content evidence by searching the key string in reverse, as shown in Figure 7.

> In the part of memory, we can also find chatting record evidence by searching the key string "https://www.linkedin.com/messaging/thread/", and find chatting content evidence by searching the key string in reverse.

Clicking "Like" Button Evidence 4.1.5

There is a function on the LinkedIn website called "Like". If people like a post, they may click the "Like" button on that post. In the part of hard disk, we can find clicking "Like" evidence by searching the keyword "likes".

In the part of memory, we can also find clicking "Like" evidence by searching the keyword "likes". As a result, by analyzing the clicking "Like" evidence, the investigator can easily realize the preference of a perpetrator.

Friend List and Friend Request 4.1.6

In the hard, we can find friends request evidence. When we search the keyword "invite-sent", we can see that there is a key string, for example, "https://www.linkedin.com/mynetwork/invite-sent/jingyou-lin-a9017b15b/?isSendInvite=true", as shown in Figure 8. The string "jing-you-lin-a9017b15b" is friend's personal ID. The string "?isSendInvite=true" represents that the user must have sent a friend request to other LinkedIn members in the past. Therefore, we can easily realize that the majority of friend-request format is often built in the form of "https://www.linkedin.com/mynetwork/invitesent/Personal-ID/?isSendInvite=true". By searching the key string "https://www.linkedin.com/mynetwork/ invite-sent/", we could easily understand whether the user had sent a friend request to other LinkedIn members or not. However, when we searched the key

string "https://www.linkedin.com/mynetwork/inviteconnect/connections/" in the hard disk, we cannot find out the friend list.

In the part of memory, we can also find friend request evidence by searching the key string "https://www. linkedin.com/mynetwork/invite-sent/". However, we cannot find out friend list by searching the key string "https://www.linkedin.com/mynetwork/inviteconnect/connections/" as well.

To sum up, the evidence we found in the memory is quite the same in the hard disk. In the memory, we also found login information, the evidence of writing a post, making comments, chatting with friends, clicking "Like" records and so on. Therefore, there is no difference between in the hard disk and in the memory that evidences we found on the Google Chrome browser.

4.2 Findings: Scenario 2: Mozilla Firefox

In scenario 2, we also aim to the hard disk and memory forensics. We did the same thing as the previous scenario did. However, the forensic target in this scenario is different from the previous scenario. In scenario 2, we did the experiment on the Mozilla Firefox browser.

4.2.1 Account and Password

In the Mozilla Firefox, we can find user account information by searching the key string "www.linkedin.com". We can also easily realize that the user must have been used this computer to perform LinkedIn activities. On the other hand, when we conduct a search for the password, we can find out password information by typing a user's password string directly.

In the part of memory, the situation is the same as in the hard disk. We can find login account and password information by searching the account string and password string directly.

4.2.2 Posting Evidence

As the same to the previous scenario, every posting has it's unique post ID. Post ID is a string of numbers. When a user writes a post on the feed, the system will automatically assign a unique ID to the posting. The posting network address is often built in the form of "https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity: Post ID". In the hard disk, by searching the key string "https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:", we can find the evidence of post creation. Therefore, we can match the post ID we found in the image file and the network address. If both of them are the same, we can definitely infer that they must have posted that article on the LinkedIn website in the past.

In the part of memory, we can also find out the evidence of post creation by searching the key strings.

4.2.3 Making Comment Evidence

As the same to the previous scenario, LinkedIn allows any people to make any comments on any articles. In the hard disk, by searching the keyword "comment", we can find out comment evidence that we made on the other user's posting.

In the part of memory, the situation is the same as in the hard disk, we can also find comment evidence and its content by searching the keyword "comment".

4.2.4 Chatting Records

As the same to the previous scenario, the majority of chatting record network address is often built in the form of "https://www.linkedin.com/messaging/thread/Chat-ID". Therefore, by searching the key string "https://www.linkedin.com/messaging/thread/", we can easily find out the chatting record evidence as well. Furthermore, we can also find out chatting content evidence by looking for the key string in reverse searching.

In the part of memory, we can also find out chatting record evidence by searching the key string "https://www.linkedin.com/messaging/thread/", and find chatting content evidence by looking for the key string in reverse searching.

4.2.5 Clicking "Like" Button Evidence

As the same to the previous scenario, we can find out clicking "Like" evidence by searching the keyword "likes" in the hard disk.

In the part of memory, we can also find out clicking "Like" evidence by searching the keyword "likes". As a result, by analyzing the clicking "Like" evidence, the investigator can easily realize the preference of a perpetrator.

4.2.6 Friend List and Friend Request

As the same to the previous scenario, we can find out friend request evidence in the hard disk. The majority of friend-request format is often built in the form of "https://www.linkedin.com/mynetwork/invitesent/Personal-ID/?isSendInvite=true". By searching the key string "https://www.linkedin.com/mynetwork/ invite-sent/", we could easily understand whether the user had sent a friend request to other LinkedIn members or not. However, when we searched the key string "https://www.linkedin.com/mynetwork/inviteconnect/connections/" in the hard disk, we cannot find out the friend list as well.

In the part of memory, we can also find out friend request evidence by searching the key string "https://www.linkedin.com/mynetwork/invite-sent/".

However, we cannot find out friend list by searching the key string "https://www.linkedin.com/mynetwork/ invite-connect/connections/" as well.

108576eaa0	68	00	74	00	74	00	70	00-73	00	3A	00	2F	00	2F	00	h-t	٠t	p-s	8-8	-/-	1.
108576eab0	77	00	77	00	77	00	2E	00-6C	00	69	00	6E	00	6B	00	w - w	-w -	1	1-i	-n -	k -
108576eac0	65	00	64	00	69	00	6E	00-2E	00	63	00	6F	00	6D	00	e -d	·i	n	c	-0-	m -
108576ead0	2F	00	75	00	61	00	73	00-2F	00	6C	00	6F	00	67	00	/ -u	-a -	s -/	1-1	-0-	g -
108576eae0	69	00	6E	00	2D	00	73	00-75	00	62	00	6D	00	69	00	i.n		s -1	ı-b	-m -	i
108576eaf0	74	00	20	00	5B	00	73	00-65	00	73	00	73	00	69	00	t.	-[-	s · e	e - s	· 8 ·	i٠
108576eb00	6F	00	6E	00	5F	00	6B	00-65	00	79	00	20	00	73	00	o -n		k-e	e •y		s -
108576eb10	65	00	73	00	73	00	69	00-6F	00	6E	00	5F	00	70	00	e ·s	•8 •	i	o -n		р-
108576eb20	61	00	73	00	73	00	77	00-6F	00	72	00	64	00	20	00	a-s	·s ·	w - 0	o-r	·d ·	
108576eb30	5D	00	20	00	23	00	30	00-02	00	00	00	31	00	00	00] -	·# ·	0 -		-1 -	
108576eb40	16	00	00	00	73	00	65	00-73	00	73	00	69	00	6F	00		·s ·	e -s	8 · S	·i ·	o -
108576eb50	6E	00	5F	00	6B	00	65	00-79	00	00	00	08	00	00	00	n	·k ·	e - J	7		
108576eb60	74	00	65	00	78	00	74	00-02	00	00	00	31	00	00	00	t∙e	·x·	t٠		-1 -	
108576eb70	20	00	00	00	61	00	74	00-63	00	74	00	73	00	67	00		-6	L a	5 B	8	
108576eb80	40	00	67	00	6D	00	61	00-69	00	6C	00	2E	00	63	00	@ -g	-m-	a · i	1-1		с·
108576eb90	6F	00	6D	00	08	00	00	00-00	00	00	00	00	00	FO	ЗF	o-m					ð2

Figure 1: The result of searching login information

03c39caac0	00	00	00	00	40	01	00	00-68	00	74	00	74	00	70	00	·····@····h·t·t·p
03c39caad0	73	00	3A	00	2F	00	2F	00-77	00	77	00	77	00	2E	00	s ·: ·/ ·/ ·w ·w ·w ·. ·
03c39caae0	6C	00	69	00	6E	00	6B	00-65	00	64	00	69	00	6E	00	l·i·n·k·e·d·i·n·
03c39caaf0	2E	00	63	00	6F	00	6D	00-2F	00	66	00	65	00	65	00	c.o.m./.f.e.e.
03c39cab00	64	00	2F	00	75	00	70	00-64	00	61	00	74	00	65	00	d·/·u·p·d·a·t·e·
03c39cab10	2F	00	75	00	72	00	6E	00-3A	00	6C	00	69	00	3A	00	/ •u •r •n •: •l •i •: •
03c39cab20	61	00	63	00	74	00	69	00-76	00	69	00	74	00	79	00	a·c·t·i·v·i·t·y·
03c39cab30	3A	00	36	00	33	00	37	00-38	00	35	00	30	00	35	00	: -6 -3 -7 -8 -5 -0 -5 -
03c39cab40	31	00	32	00	36	00	35	00-31	00	32	00	30	00	37	00	1 - 2 - 6 - 5 - 1 - 2 - 0 - 7 -
03c39cab50	34	00	37	00	35	00	32	00-2F	00	3F	00	63	00	6F	00	4 -7 -5 -2 -/ -? -c -o -
03c39cab60	6D	00	6D	00	65	00	6E	00-74	00	55	00	72	00	6E	00	m·m·e·n·t·U·r·n·
03c39cab70	3D	00	75	00	72	00	6E	00-25	00	33	00	41	00	6C	00	$= \cdot \mathbf{u} \cdot \mathbf{r} \cdot \mathbf{n} \cdot \mathbf{\$} \cdot 3 \cdot \mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{l} \cdot$

Figure 2: The evidence of post creation was found

108e97b400	74	00	22	00	5D	00	2C	00-22	00	61	00	74	00	74	00	t.".].,.".a.t.t.
108e97b410	72	00	69	00	62	00	75	00-74	00	65	00	73	00	22	00	r·i·b·u·t·e·s·"·
108e97b420	3A	00	5B	00	5D	00	2C	00-22	00	74	00	65	00	78	00	: []]".t.e.x.
108e97b430	74	00	22	00	3A	00	22	00-57	00	68	00	79	00	20	00	t·"·:·"·W·h·y·
108e97b440	70	00	65	00	6F	00	70	00-6C	00	65	00	20	00	61	00	p·e·o·p·l·e· ·a·
108e97b450	6C	00	77	00	61	00	79	00-73	00	20	00	6C	00	6F	00	lways loo
108e97b460	76	00	65	00	20	00	74	00-6F	00	20	00	67	00	6F	00	ve· to· goo
108e97b470	20	00	6D	00	6F	00	75	00-6E	00	74	00	61	00	69	00	·m·o·u·n·t·a·i·
108e97b480	6E	00	20	00	63	00	6C	00-69	00	6D	00	62	00	69	00	n · · c·l·i·m·b·i·
108e97b490	6E	00	67	00	2C	00	20	00-68	00	6F	00	77	00	65	00	n·g·,· ∘h·o·w·e·
108e97b4a0	76	00	65	00	72	00	2C	00-20	00	74	00	68	00	65	00	v·e·r·,· ·t·h·e·
108e97b4b0	20	00	61	00	6E	00	73	00-77	00	65	00	72	00	20	00	·a·n·s·w·e·r·
108e97b4c0	69	00	73	00	20	00	70	00-72	00	69	00	6E	00	74	00	i·s· ·p·r·i·n·t·
108e97b4d0	69	00	6E	00	67	00	20	00-6F	00	6E	00	20	00	74	00	i n g · o n · t ·
108e97b4e0	68	00	69	00	73	00	20	00-70	00	68	00	6F	00	74	00	h·i·s· ·p·h·o·t·
108e97b4f0	6F	00	67	00	72	00	61	00-70	00	68	00	21	00	22	00	o-g-r-a-p-h-!-"
108e97b500	2C	00	22	00	24	00	74	00-79	00	70	00	65	00	22	00	, •" •\$ •t •y •p •e •" •
108e97b510	3A	00	22	00	63	00	6F	00-6D	00	2E	00	6C	00	69	00	: ·"·c·o·m·.·l·i·
108e97b520	6E	00	6B	00	65	00	64	00-69	00	6E	00	2E	00	76	00	n ·k ·e ·d ·i ·n ·. ·v ·
108e97b530	6F	00	79	00	61	00	67	00 - 65	00	72	00	2E	00	63	00	o ·y ·a ·g ·e ·r ·. ·c ·
108e97b540	6F	00	6D	00	6D	00	6F	00-6E	00	2E	00	54	00	65	00	o·m·m·o·n·, ·T·e·
108e97b550	78	00	74	00	56	00	69	00 - 65	00	77	00	4D	00	6F	00	x·t·V·i·e·w·M·o·
108e97b560	64	00	65	00	6C	00	22	00-2C	00	22	00	24	00	69	00	d • e • l • " • , • " • \$ • i •
108e97b570	64	00	22	00	3A	00	22	00-75	00	72	00	6E	00	3A	00	$\mathbf{d} \cdot \mathbf{"} \cdot \mathbf{:} \cdot \mathbf{"} \cdot \mathbf{u} \cdot \mathbf{r} \cdot \mathbf{n} \cdot \mathbf{:} \cdot$
108e97b580	6C	00	69	00	3A	00	66	00-73	00	5F	00	6E	00	6F	00	l·i·: ·f·s·_n·o·
108e97b590	74	00	69	00	66	00	69	00-63	00	61	00	74	00	69	00	t·i·f·i·c·a·t·i·
108e97b5a0	6F	00	6E	00	43	00	61	00-72	00	64	00	3A	00	75	00	o ·n ·C ·a ·r ·d ·: ·u ·
108e97b5b0	72	00	6E	00	3A	00	6C	00-69	00	3A	00	6E	00	6F	00	$\mathbf{r} \cdot \mathbf{n} \cdot \mathbf{:} \cdot \mathbf{l} \cdot \mathbf{i} \cdot \mathbf{:} \cdot \mathbf{n} \cdot \mathbf{o}$
108e97b5c0	74	00	69	00	66	00	69	00-63	00	61	00	74	00	69	00	t·i·f·i·c·a·t·i·
108e97b5d0	6F	00	6E	00	56	00	32	00-3A	00	28	00	75	00	72	00	o·n·V·2·:·(·u·r·
108e97b5e0	6E	00	3A	00	6C	00	69	00-3A	00	6D	00	65	00	6D	00	$n \cdot : \cdot l \cdot i \cdot : \cdot m \cdot e \cdot m \cdot$
108e97b5f0	62	00	65	00	72	00	3A	00-36	00	34	00	32	00	37	00	b·e·r·: ·6·4·2·7·
108e97b600	31	00	39	00	36	00	37	00 - 34	00	2C	00	53	00	48	00	1 • 9 • 6 • 7 • 4 • , • S • H •
108e97b610	41	00	52	00	45	00	2C	00-61	00	63	00	74	00	69	00	A·R·E·, ·a·c·t·i·
108e97b620	76	00	69	00	74	00	79	00-3A	00	36	00	33	00	37	00	v·i·t·y·: 6·3·7·
108e97b630	38	00	35	00	30	00	35	00-31	00	32	00	36	00	35	00	8 - 5 - 0 - 5 - 1 - 2 - 6 - 5 -
108e97b640	31	00	32	00	30	00	37	00-34	00	37	00	35	00	32	00	1 - 2 - 0 - 7 - 4 - 7 - 5 - 2 -
108e97b650	29	00	2C	00	63	00	6F	00-6E	00	74	00	65	00	6E	00	, .c.o.n.t.e.n.

Figure 3: Post content was found by searching key string

0b9f4483a0	00	00	00	00	66	00	00	00-2F	00	76	00	6F	00	79	00	····f···/·v·o·y·
0b9f4483b0	61	00	67	00	65	00	72	00-2F	00	61	00	70	00	69	00	a·g·e·r·/ ·a·p·i·
0b9f4483c0	2F	00	66	00	65	00	65	00 - 64	00	2F	00	63	00	6F	00	/ •f •e •e •d •/ •c •o •
0b9f4483d0	6D	00	6D	00	65	00	6E	00 - 74	00	73	00	$2\mathbf{F}$	00	75	00	m·m·e·n·t·s·/·u·
0b9f4483e0	72	00	6E	00	25	00	33	00 - 41	00	6C	00	69	00	25	00	r •n •% •3 •A •1 •i •% •
0b9f4483f0	33	00	41	00	63	00	6F	00-6D	00	6D	00	65	00	6E	00	3 · A · c · o · m · m · e · n ·
0b9f448400	74	00	25	00	33	00	41	00 - 28	00	61	00	63	00	74	00	t -% -3 -A - (-a -c -t -
0b9f448410	69	00	76	00	69	00	74	00 - 79	00	25	00	33	00	41	00	i ·v ·i ·t ·y ·% ·3 ·A ·
0b9f448420	36	00	33	00	37	00	38	00 - 35	00	30	00	32	00	32	00	6-3-7-8-5-0-2-2-
0b9f448430	33	00	34	00	38	00	36	00 - 32	00	33	00	33	00	38	00	3 - 4 - 8 - 6 - 2 - 3 - 3 - 8 -
0b9f448440	30	00	34	00	38	00	25	00 - 32	00	43	00	36	00	33	00	0 - 4 - 8 - 8 - 2 - C - 6 - 3 -
0b9f448450	37	00	38	00	35	00	30	00-33	00	30	00	39	00	35	00	7 - 8 - 5 - 0 - 3 - 0 - 9 - 5 -
0b9f448460	35	00	35	00	38	00	37	00-37	00	30	00	36	00	38	00	5 - 5 - 8 - 7 - 7 - 0 - 6 - 8 -
0b9f448470	38	00	29	00	00	00	00	00-F1	DA	86	6D	6C	00	00	00	8 ·) · · · · ·ñÚ ·ml · · ·

Figure 4: The evidence of comment creation was found by searching keyword "comment"

0bbf201930	49	00	74	00	27	00	73	00-2	0 00	61	00	20	00	67	00	I .t .' .s	·a· ·g·
0bbf201940	72	00	65	00	61	00	74	00 - 2	0 00	73	00	75	00	6E	00	r·e·a·t·	·s·u·n·
0bbf201950	73	00	65	00	74	00	21	00-0	0 00	00	00	75	00	2E	00	s·e·t·!·	· · · · u · . ·

Figure 5: Post content was found by searching key string

0046a33ec0	34	34	33	33	32	38	2F	02-44	05	05	00	81	09	01	68	443328/ ·D · · · ·	h
0046a33ed0	74	74	70	73	3A	2F	2F	77-77	77	2E	6C	69	6E	6B	65	ttps://www.lin	ke
0046a33ee0	64	69	6E	2E	63	6F	6D	2F-6D	65	73	73	61	67	69	6E	din.com/messag	in
0046a33ef0	67	2F	74	68	72	65	61	64-2F	36	33	37	38	34	39	39	g/thread/63784	99
0046a33f00	39	31	38	37	33	38	33	39-39	32	33	32	2F	02	44	04	918738399232/	D٠

Figure 6: The evidence of chat record

00ff5f3b70	48	65	6C	6C	6F	2C	20	6E-69	63	65	20	74	6F	20	6D	Hello, nice to m
00ff5f3b80	65	65	74	20	79	6F	75	2E-0A	48	65	72	65	2C	20	77	eet you. Here, w
00ff5f3b90	65	20	61	72	65	20	67	6F-69	6E	67	20	74	6F	20	74	e are going to t
00ff5f3ba0	61	6B	65	20	73	6F	6D	65-20	65	78	70	65	72	69	6D	ake some experim
00ff5f3bb0	65	6E	74	2E	00	00	00	00-F1	22	40	89	86	01	00	00	entñ"@

Figure 7: The evidence of chat content

1494c5bc0	74	00	61	00	67	00	09	00-68	00	74	00	74	00	70	00	c.a.gh.t.t.p
1494c5bd0	73	00	3A	00	2F	00	$2\mathbf{F}$	00-77	00	77	00	77	00	2E	00	s ·: ·/ ·/ ·w ·w ·w ·. ·
1494c5be0	6C	00	69	00	6E	00	6B	00 - 65	00	64	00	69	00	6E	00	l·i·n·k·e·d·i·n·
1494c5bf0	2E	00	63	00	6F	00	6D	00-2F	00	6D	00	79	00	6E	00	. ·c·o·m·/ ·m·y·n·
1494c5c00	65	00	74	00	77	00	6F	00 - 72	00	6B	00	2F	00	69	00	e t w o r k / i
1494c5c10	6E	00	76	00	69	00	74	00 - 65	00	2D	00	73	00	65	00	n·v·i·t·e·-·s·e·
1494c5c20	6E	00	74	00	2 F	00	6A.	00-69	00	6E	00	67	00	2D	00	n·t·/·j·i·n·g·-·
1494c5c30	79	00	6F	00	75	00	2D	00-6C	00	69	00	6E	00	2D	00	y ·o ·u ·= ·l ·i ·n ·= ·
1494c5c40	61	00	39	00	30	00	31	00-37	00	62	00	31	00	35	00	a-9-0-1-7-b-1-5-
1494c5c50	62	00	2F	00	3F	00	69	00 - 73	00	53	00	65	00	6E	00	b ·/ ·? ·i ·s ·S ·e ·n ·
1494c5c60	64	00	49	00	6E	00	76	00-69	00	74	00	65	00	3D	00	d · I · n · v · i · t · e ·= ·
1494c5c70	74	00	72	00	75	00	65	00-0D	00	31	00	34	00	34	00	t.r.u.e1.4.4.

Figure 8: The evidence of friend request

To sum up, the evidence we found in the memory is quite the same in the hard disk. In the part of memory, we also found login information, the evidence of post creation, making comments, chatting records, clicking "Like" records and so on. Therefore, there is no difference between in the hard disk and in the memory that evidences we found on the Mozilla Firefox browser.

4.3 Findings: Scenario 3: Microsoft Edge

In scenario 3, we also aim to the hard disk and memory forensics. We did the same thing as the previous scenarios did. However, the forensic target in this scenario is different from the previous two scenarios. In scenario 3, we did the experiment on the Microsoft Edge browser.

4.3.1 Account and Password

In Microsoft Edge, we can find user account and password information by looking for the string in reverse searching. By typing account string and password string, we can see there is a key string "www.linkedin.com" in the context. Therefore, we can easily realize that the user must have been used this computer to perform LinkedIn activities.

In the part of memory, the situation is the same as in the hard disk. We can find login account and password information by searching account string and password string directly.

4.3.2 Posting Evidence

As the same to the previous scenarios, every posting has it's unique post ID. Post ID is a string of numbers. When a user writes a post on the feed, the system will automatically assign a unique ID to the posting. The posting network address is often built in the form of "https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity: Post ID". In the hard disk, by searching the key string "https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:" we can find the evidence of post creation. Therefore, we can match the post ID we found in the image file and the network address. If both of them are the same, we can definitely infer that they must have posted that article on the LinkedIn website in the past. Furthermore, we can find the content of posting by inverse searching.

In the part of memory, we can also find out the evidence of post creation and its contents by searching the key strings.

4.3.3 Making Comment Evidence

As the same to the previous scenarios, LinkedIn allows any people to make any comments on any articles. In the hard disk, by searching the keyword "comment", we can find out comment evidence that we made on the other user's posting.

In the part of memory, the situation is the same as in the hard disk, we can also find comment evidence and its content by searching the keyword "comment".

4.3.4 Chatting Records

As the same to the previous scenarios, the majority of chatting record network address is often built in the form of "https://www.linkedin.com/messaging/thread/Chat-ID". Therefore, by searching the key string "https://www.linkedin.com/messaging/thread/", we can easily find out the chatting record evidence as well. Furthermore, we can also find chatting content by looking for the key string in reverse searching.

In the part of memory, we can also find out chatting record evidence by searching the key string "https://www.linkedin.com/messaging/thread/", and find chatting content by looking for the key string in reverse searching.

4.3.5 Clicking "Like" Button Evidence

As the same to the previous scenarios, we can find out clicking "Like" evidence by searching the keyword "likes" no matter in the hard disk or in the memory.

4.3.6 Friend List and Friend Request

As the same to the previous scenarios, we can find out friend request evidence in the hard disk. The majority of friend-request format is often built in the form of "https://www.linkedin.com/mynetwork/invitesent/Personal-ID/?isSendInvite=true". By searching the key string "https://www.linkedin.com/mynetwork/ invite-sent/", we could easily understand whether the user had sent a friend request to other LinkedIn members or not. However, when we searched the key string "https://www.linkedin.com/mynetwork/inviteconnect/connections/" in the hard disk, we cannot find out the friend list as well.

In the part of memory, we can also find out friend request evidence by searching the key string "https://www.linkedin.com/mynetwork/invite-sent/".

However, we cannot find out friend list by searching the key string "https://www.linkedin.com/mynetwork/ invite-connect/connections/" as well. To sum up, the evidence we found in the memory is quite the same in the hard disk. In the part of memory, we also found login information, the evidence of post creation, making comments, chatting records, clicking "Like" records and so on. Therefore, there is no difference between in the hard disk and in the memory that evidences we found on the Microsoft Edge browser.

4.4 Experiment Comparison

After we conducted these three scenarios, we drew a table to clearly comparing the difference between them. As shown in Table 1, we can realize that there is no difference between them. No matter the evidence stored in the hard disk or in the memory, the evidence we can find in the Google Chrome, in the Mozilla Firefox or in the Microsoft Edge were the same. Moreover, all the searching keywords

	1		0			
Category	Google C	Chrome	Mozilla l	Firefox	Microsof	t Edge
Activity	Hard Disk	Memory	Hard Disk	Memory	Hard Disk	Memory
Account	0	0	0	0	0	0
Password			0	0	0	0
Post evidence	0	0	0	0	0	0
Make comment evidence	0	О	0	0	0	0
Click "Like" button evidence	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chat records	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chat contents	0	0	0	0	0	Ο
Friend list						
Friend request	0	0	О	0	О	0

Table 1: The comparison of findings between browsers

O: Found —: None

or key strings are the same in the hard disk as compared References in the memory. Therefore, the majority of evidence can be found in the hard disk and in the memory.

$\mathbf{5}$ Conclusions

Nowadays, thanks to the rapid development of new technologies, thousands of new social networking sites have sprung up over the past few years, such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and so on. However, there are still some problems we should concern, that is, various kinds of cybercrime emerge endlessly in recent years. In order to assist investigators to investigate cybercrimes, this paper proposes a forensic way to investigate a perpetrator who commits a crime via the LinkedIn social networking site on the computer. We did a series of user activities that users may operate it. All of these behaviors were conducted respectively on three different browsers, including Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, and Microsoft Edge. Moreover, these three different browsers were conducted respectively on three different clean computers.

After completing these procedures, we adopt a forensic tool called FTK Imager to create an image file for the hard disk. On the other hand, we adopt the MANDIANT tool to create an image file for the memory. Thereafter, in order not to influence the integrity of digital evidence, we make use of FTK Imager to analyze image files on the other clean computer. In our experiment, we can find many kinds of evidences, for example, post creation, comment creation, browsing evidence, chatting records, clicking the "Like" button on the other postings and so forth. Finally, we compare our findings between these three different browsers, as shown in Table 1.

All of the findings could be used for cybercrime investigation. The investigators can analyze preference or daily activities of a perpetrator based on important information. Furthermore, if computer crime happened, all of the evidences extracted and analyzed by the investigator could be a crucial admission on the court.

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