

A Pseudo Random Number Generator Based on Chaotic Billiards

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Abstract

The systems of chaotic billiards revealed a well developed chaotic behavior. Despite its good characteristics, these systems have not yet been applied to the cryptography; among the reasons is the difficulty of expressing the equation of particle motion in an explicit form. In this work, we took advantage the properties offered by the random walks and unpredictability of two particles moving in a chaotic billiard (Sinai Billiard) for the designing a new pseudo-random number generator. The results are subjected to an experimental study to test the randomness and the chaotic behavior of the generator. the key stream passed all the NIST statistical tests and the generator is highly sensitive for a bit change in the keys.

Keywords: Chaos, pseudo-random number generator, Sinai billiard

1 Introduction

The use of chaotic systems in cryptography has been well studied [17, 18, 19]. In fact there are similarities between the needs of cryptography and properties offered by the chaos. The algorithms based on chaos showed good performance for data encryption such as images, videos or audio data [1, 16, 20, 25]. Characterized by speed, reproducibility and simplicity of implementation, the PRNGs based on chaos took more attention. The first PRNG was proposed by Oishi and Inoue [21] in 1982, using the chaotic first order nonlinear differential equations. After this article, several GNPA's were suggested. Generators have been proposed based on the logistic system in [2, 15, 23]. In [28], a generator based on the generalized Henon map. Using the Lorenz system, a new generator for the voice data encryption is designed in [1]. Chaotic standard system was applied in the conception of the generator in [22].

Our work focuses on an alternative approach based on the implementation of a system more concrete that has

interesting chaotic properties, those are the systems of chaotic billiards in two dimensions [7]. They are among the classes of simple systems, which are still exploring chaos. The mathematical theory of billiards was introduced by Sinai in 1970 [26]. It is developed and evolved with remarkable speed to become a well grounded within the theory of dynamical systems theory and statistical mechanics. Several studies were devoted specifically to the chaotic billiards. In billiards where a particle moves with constant velocity and reflects off the border in accordance with the law: "the incidence angle is equal to the reflection angle". The angles and positions taken by the particle can be treated as random variables, which encouraged us to use it in the construction of a new PRNG. Sinai billiards is the first class of chaotic billiards, it is also called the dispersion system. A circular disc inside the billiard causes divergent trajectories.

This work is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the Sinai billiard, its geometric shape, the direction of a particle travelling in the billiard table and its chaotic properties. In Section 3 we give a detailed description of our PRNG. A validation of the PRNG by test batteries and a study chaotic behavior of the sequences generated by our generator are reported in Section 4. In the final section, we draw a conclusion.

2 Presentation of the Sinai Billiard

The Sinai Billiard (Figure 1) is a planar area, consisting of a square of side $2a$ and a circular barrier with radius $r < a$ is placed at the center. A free billiard two-dimensional ($2D$) witch was proposed by Sinai in 1970 [26]. Billiards emerged to simplify the study of the behavior of two discs (gas molecule) bouncing by mutual collisions in a square. The dynamics of two interacting disks reduces to that of Sinai billiard. The billiard is sometimes called the Lorentz gas. The notations of the paper is listed in Table 1.

Table 1: Notations

$PRNG$	Pseudo-random number generator
S	the random sequence $S = S_1 S_2 \dots$
Pw	Password
L	Password length
$[]$	The integer part
\bar{p}	Invert bits of p
A^i	The collision point at the i^{th} step
$D(O, D_n)$	The distance from O to D_n
Δ_n	Discriminant
f	Transition function
\oplus	Bitwise exclusive OR operator
HD	Hamming distance
\parallel	Concatenation operation




Figure 1: Sinai billiard

2.1 The Billiard Geometric and Particle Direction Description

In an orthonormal (O, \vec{i}, \vec{j}) , we are interested in the billiard whose border $\Gamma = \cup_{i=1}^5 \Gamma_i$ (Figure 1), is constituted by a square with side $2a$ and a circular hole of center O and radius $r < \frac{3}{2}a$. A closed domain limited by portions in Euclidean space in two dimensions \mathbb{R}^2 . The set $s = \cup_{i \neq j} \Gamma_i \cap \Gamma_j$ is the singular part of the border, it is composed of 4 points and $\Gamma \setminus s$ is the set of regular points of the border. In any regular point there is an internal normal vector \vec{N} . A point particle travels the billiard at a constant velocity v . When it reaches the border, undergoes elastic collision with specular reflection according to the law of reflection, the angle of incidence is equal to the angle of reflection with respect to \vec{N} the normal vector at the border collision point. Between two collisions, the particle follows a straight path.

Initially, the particle oriented at an angle $\theta_0 = \overrightarrow{(\vec{i}, v_0)}$ where \vec{i} is the unit vector of x -axis. We have:

$$\vec{v}_0 = \cos(\theta_0)\vec{i} + \sin(\theta_0)\vec{j}.$$

After collision, we have Equation (1):

$$\overrightarrow{(\vec{i}, v_{new})} = \overrightarrow{(\vec{i}, v_{old})} + \overrightarrow{(v_{old}, \vec{N})} + \overrightarrow{(\vec{N}, v_{new})} \pmod{2\pi}. \quad (1)$$

After collision rule, we have:

$$\overrightarrow{(\vec{N}, v_{new})} = \overrightarrow{(-v_{old}, \vec{N})}.$$

We have also:

$$\begin{aligned} \overrightarrow{(-v_{old}, \vec{N})} &= \overrightarrow{(-v_{old}, v_{old})} + \overrightarrow{(v_{old}, \vec{N})} \pmod{2\pi} \\ &= \pi + \overrightarrow{(v_{old}, \vec{N})} \pmod{2\pi}. \end{aligned}$$

Therefore Equation (1) becomes:

$$\overrightarrow{(\vec{i}, v_{new})} = \overrightarrow{(\vec{i}, v_{old})} + 2\overrightarrow{(v_{old}, \vec{N})} + \pi \pmod{2\pi}. \quad (2)$$

At the $(n+1)^{th}$ collision, where $n \geq 0$, we put $\theta_n = \overrightarrow{(\vec{i}, v_{old})}$ and we obtain $\theta_{n+1} = \overrightarrow{(\vec{i}, v_{new})}$ and therefore Equation (2) becomes:

$$\theta_{n+1} = \theta_n + 2\overrightarrow{(v_n, \vec{N}_{n+1})} + \pi \pmod{2\pi} \quad (3)$$

such as:

$$\vec{v}_n = \cos(\theta_n)\vec{i} + \sin(\theta_n)\vec{j}$$

where \vec{N}_{n+1} the unit normal vector at the border to the $(n+1)^{th}$ collision. We have after the geometric shape of the billiard:

$$\vec{N}_{n+1} = \begin{cases} -\frac{x_{n+1}}{|x_{n+1}|} & \text{if } |x_{n+1}| = a \\ -\frac{y_{n+1}}{|y_{n+1}|} & \text{if } |y_{n+1}| = a \\ \frac{x_{n+1}\vec{i} + y_{n+1}\vec{j}}{\sqrt{x_{n+1}^2 + y_{n+1}^2}} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

We consider $A_{n+1}(x_{n+1}, y_{n+1})$ the point of $(n+1)^{th}$ collision, therefore A_{n+1} belongs to the intersection of the particles trajectory with billiard border Γ .

We define f , the transition function from (A_n, θ_n) to (A_{n+1}, θ_{n+1}) such as:

$$(x_{n+1}, y_{n+1}, \theta_{n+1}) = f(x_n, y_n, \theta_n).$$

2.2 The Transition Function f Description

We give the algorithm description of the transition function f between two collisions A_n and A_{n+1} :

$$f: [-a; a]^2 \times [0; 2\pi] \mapsto [-a; a]^2 \times [0; 2\pi]$$

$$(x_n, y_n, \theta_n) \mapsto (x_{n+1}, y_{n+1}, \theta_{n+1}).$$

The equation of motion particle between two collisions is:

$$(D_n): \sin(\theta_n)x - \cos(\theta_n)y - \sin(\theta_n)x_n + \cos(\theta_n)y_n = 0. \quad (4)$$

a) For $\theta_n \notin \left\{0, \frac{\pi}{2}, \pi, \frac{3\pi}{2}\right\}$.

From Equation (4), we have $y = \tan(\theta_n)(x - x_n) + y_n$,

we put $g_n(x) = \tan(\theta_n)(x - x_n) + y_n$ and we have $x = \cot(\theta_n)(y - y_n) + x_n$, we put $h_n(y) = \cot(\theta_n)(y - y_n) + x_n$.

The distance from O to D_n is:

$$d(O, D_n) = |-x_n \sin(\theta_n) + y_n \cos(\theta_n)|.$$

1) In case where $A_{n+1} \in (D_n) \cap \Gamma_5$, $A_{n+1} \in (D_n) \cap \Gamma_5$ then $d(O, D_n) \leq r$ and $A_n \notin \Gamma_5$, therefore:

$$\begin{cases} (x_{n+1})^2 + (y_{n+1})^2 = r^2 \\ \sin(\theta_n)x_{n+1} - \cos(\theta_n)y_{n+1} - \sin(\theta_n)x_n + \cos(\theta_n)y_n = 0 \end{cases}$$

⇕

$$\begin{cases} (x_{n+1})^2 + (y_{n+1})^2 = r^2 \\ y = \tan(\theta_n)(x - x_n) + y_n = g_n(x) \end{cases}$$

We find

$$(5) \begin{cases} (x_{n+1})^2 + (y_{n+1})^2 = r^2 \\ \frac{1}{\cos^2(\theta_n)}(x_{n+1})^2 + 2(y_n - \tan(\theta_n)x_n) \tan(\theta_n)x_{n+1} + (y_n - \tan(\theta_n))^2 - r^2 = 0 \end{cases}$$

Δ_n discriminant of (5) is defined as:

$$\Delta_n = 4\left(\frac{r^2}{\cos^2(\theta_n)} - (y_n - \tan(\theta_n))^2\right)$$

Two possible solutions are:

$$x_{n+1} = \cos^2(\theta_n) \left(- (y_n - \tan(\theta_n)) \tan(\theta_n) - \frac{\sqrt{\Delta_n}}{2} \right)$$

or

$$x_{n+1} = \cos^2(\theta_n) \left(- (y_n - \tan(\theta_n)) \tan(\theta_n) + \frac{\sqrt{\Delta_n}}{2} \right)$$

and $y_{n+1} = g(x_{n+1})$. For $\theta_n \in \left[0, \frac{\pi}{2}\right] \cup \left[\frac{3\pi}{2}, \pi\right]$, we have:

$$x_{n+1} = \cos^2(\theta_n) \left(- (y_n - \tan(\theta_n)) \tan(\theta_n) - \frac{\sqrt{\Delta_n}}{2} \right)$$

and for $\theta_n \in \left[\frac{\pi}{2}, \pi\right] \cup \left[\pi, \frac{3\pi}{2}\right]$ we have:

$$x_{n+1} = \cos^2(\theta_n) \left(- (y_n - \tan(\theta_n)) \tan(\theta_n) + \frac{\sqrt{\Delta_n}}{2} \right)$$

2) In case where $A_{n+1} \in (D_n) \cap (\cup_{i=1}^4 \Gamma_i)$, $A_{n+1} \in (D_n) \cap (\cup_{i=1}^4 \Gamma_i)$ then $d(O, D_n) > r$ or $A_n \in \Gamma_5$ for $\theta_n \in \left[0, \frac{\pi}{2}\right] \cup \left[\frac{3\pi}{2}, 2\pi\right]$, we have:

$$(x_{n+1}, y_{n+1}) = \begin{cases} (a, g_n(a)) & \text{if } -a \leq g_n(a) \leq a \\ (h_n(a), a) & \text{if } g_n(a) > a \\ (h_n(-a), -a) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

for $\theta_n \in \left[\frac{\pi}{2}, \pi\right] \cup \left[\pi, \frac{3\pi}{2}\right]$, we have:

$$(x_{n+1}, y_{n+1}) = \begin{cases} (-a, g_n(-a)) & \text{if } -a \leq g_n(-a) \leq a \\ (h_n(a), a) & \text{if } g_n(-a) > a \\ (h_n(-a), -a) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

b) For $\theta_n \in \left\{0, \frac{\pi}{2}, \pi, \frac{3\pi}{2}\right\}$.

1) In case where $\theta_n \in \left\{\frac{\pi}{2}, \frac{3\pi}{2}\right\}$.

$$(x_{n+1}, y_{n+1}) =$$

$$\begin{cases} (x_n, a) & \text{if } A_n \in \Gamma_5 \text{ and } y_n \geq 0 \\ (x_n, -a) & \text{if } A_n \in \Gamma_5 \text{ and } y_n < 0 \\ (x_n, \sqrt{r^2 - x_n^2}) & \text{if } A_n \notin \Gamma_5 \text{ and } -r < x_n < r \text{ and } y_n \geq 0 \\ (x_n, -\sqrt{r^2 - x_n^2}) & \text{if } A_n \notin \Gamma_5 \text{ and } -r < x_n < r \text{ and } y_n < 0 \\ (x_n, -y_n) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

2) In case where $\theta_n \in \{0, \pi\}$.

$$(x_{n+1}, y_{n+1}) =$$

$$\begin{cases} (a, y_n) & \text{if } A_n \in \Gamma_5 \text{ and } x_n \geq 0 \\ (-a, y_n) & \text{if } A_n \in \Gamma_5 \text{ and } x_n < 0 \\ (\sqrt{r^2 - y_n^2}, y_n) & \text{if } A_n \notin \Gamma_5 \text{ and } -r < y_n < r \text{ and } x_n \geq 0 \\ (-\sqrt{r^2 - y_n^2}, y_n) & \text{if } A_n \notin \Gamma_5 \text{ and } -r < y_n < r \text{ and } x_n < 0 \\ (-x_n, y_n) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

2.3 The Sinai Billiards Chaotic and Ergodic Properties

After the publication of the Article [26] in 1970, Sinai billiard has become popular, it has undergone many subsequent studies by many mathematicians and physicists authors [3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 26, 27]. The system shows a completely chaotic behavior [12, 26].

In general, the geometric shape of its boundaries determines dynamic billiards properties. It may consist of a convex curve, concave or linear. Sinai has shown in [26] that all billiards with the outwardly convex borders are always strongly chaotic. In [12], Per Dahlqvist has calculated an explicit expression of the Lyapunov exponent λ of Sinai billiard. λ measure quantitatively the chaos of dynamical systems, being positive means that there is a dependence on initial conditions (i.e the chaos existence). λ is positive for all values of the radius r of the disc.

Sinai has developed a method to prove that all dispersing billiard (Sinai billiard) is ergodic, mixing and it has a stronger property, the K-mixing. Moreover Gallavotti and Ornstein proved in [14] that the Sinai billiard is a Bernoulli system. The Bernoulli property is the strongest among the ergodic properties. It involves K-mixing, mixing and ergodicity.

3 Designing a PRNG Based on the Sinai Billiard finally

It is a deterministic pseudo-random numbers generator initialized by a password the Pw with arbitrary sized, the output is a cryptographically secure binary sequence. we consider two point particles that move in the Sinai billiard with a constant velocity $\|\vec{v}_1\| = \|\vec{v}_2\| = 1$, without interaction between it. The departure point for the first particle (resp. second particle) is O_1 (resp. O_2) such as $\vec{OO}_1 = \frac{3a}{4}\vec{i}$ (resp. $\vec{OO}_2 = -\frac{3a}{4}\vec{i}$). Initially, it is oriented by $\vec{v}_{0,1}$ (resp. $\vec{v}_{0,2}$) such as $\theta_{0,1} = (\vec{i}, \vec{v}_{0,1})$ (resp. $\theta_{0,2} = (\vec{i}, \vec{v}_{0,2})$) where:

$$0 \leq \theta_{0,1}, \theta_{0,2} < 2\pi.$$

The angles $\theta_{0,1}$ and $\theta_{0,2}$ are calculated from the Pw using a technique based on a pointer, it positions on the Pw bits. The pointer moves from a position to other according to a linear congruential throughout the ASCII representation of Pw .

After initialization, we performed a predetermined number of collisions for the two particles, then start generating individuals necessary for the construction of the final sequence $S = S_1 S_2 \dots S_i \dots$ with $S_i = I_{i,1} \oplus I_{i,2}$, $I_{i,1}$ and $I_{i,2}$ are two individuals generated in the i^{th} step. At each step i two individuals $I_{i,1}$ and $I_{i,2}$ of 32 bits will be generated based on the coordinates of the collision point of two balls with the square border of the billiard.

3.1 The Initial Values $\theta_{0,1}$ and $\theta_{0,2}$ Calculation

From a password $Pw = (p_{L-1} \dots p_2 p_1 p_0)_2$, a binary string of any length L , we calculate the initialization angles $\theta_{0,1}$ and $\theta_{0,2}$. For each angle, we need to extract 64 bits from Pw . We consider a pointer pt that takes values indicating the bit positions in the Pw . The positions suite is defined as following:

$$\begin{cases} pt(0) &= 1 \\ pt(i+1) &= \left(\left(\left[\frac{L}{2} \right] + 1 \right) \times pt(i) + 1 \right) \text{mod}(L) \text{ for } i \geq 0 \end{cases}$$

The pointer moves on the Pw , every time it positions on a new bit p_i and reads the information 0 or 1 necessary to calculate $\theta_{0,1}$ and $\theta_{0,2}$. We find $I_{0,1}$ and $I_{0,2}$ ($0 \leq I_{0,1}, I_{0,2} < 2^{64}$) as following:

$$\begin{aligned} I_{0,1} &= (\bar{p}_{pt(63)} p_{pt(62)} \dots p_{pt(2)} \bar{p}_{pt(1)} p_1)_2 \\ &= p_1 + \sum_{i=0}^{31} \bar{p}_{pt(2 \times i + 1)} \times 2^i + \sum_{i=1}^{31} p_{pt(2 \times i)} \times 2^i \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} I_{0,2} &= (p_{L-1-pt(63)} \bar{p}_{L-1-pt(62)} \dots p_{L-1-pt(1)} \bar{p}_{L-2})_2 \\ &= \bar{p}_{L-2} + \sum_{i=0}^{31} p_{pt(2 \times i + 1)} \times 2^i + \sum_{i=1}^{31} \bar{p}_{pt(2 \times i)} \times 2^i \end{aligned}$$

$$\theta_{0,1} = \frac{2\pi \times I_{0,1}}{2^{64}} \quad \text{and} \quad \theta_{0,2} = \frac{2\pi \times I_{0,2}}{2^{64}}$$

We call Initialize the initial values $\theta_{0,1}$ and $\theta_{0,2}$ calculation algorithm (Algorithm 1).

Algorithm 1 Calculation of $\theta_{0,1}$ and $\theta_{0,2}$

- 1: Begin
 - 2: On taking password $Pw = (p_{L-1} \dots p_2 p_1 p_0)_2$ a binary string of any length L .
 - 3: $pt \leftarrow 1$
 - 4: $I_{0,1} \leftarrow p_1$
 - 5: $I_{0,2} \leftarrow p_{L-2}$
 - 6: **for** $i = 1$ to 63 **do**
 - 7: $pt \leftarrow \left(\left(\left[\frac{L}{2} \right] + 1 \right) \times pt + 1 \right) \text{mod}(L)$
 - 8: **if** i is even **then**
 - 9: $I_{0,1} \leftarrow I_{0,1} + \bar{p}_{pt} \times 2^i$
 - 10: $I_{0,2} \leftarrow I_{0,2} + p_{L-1-pt} \times 2^i$
 - 11: **else** $\{i$ is odd $\}$
 - 12: $I_{0,1} \leftarrow I_{0,1} + p_{pt} \times 2^i$
 - 13: $I_{0,2} \leftarrow I_{0,2} + \bar{p}_{L-1-pt} \times 2^i$
 - 14: **end if**
 - 15: **end for**
 - 16: $\theta_{0,1} \leftarrow \frac{2\pi \times I_{0,1}}{2^{64}}$
 - 17: $\theta_{0,2} \leftarrow \frac{2\pi \times I_{0,2}}{2^{64}}$
 - 18: End
-

3.2 Generating the Pseudo-random Sequence

After calculating the initialization's angles $\theta_{0,1}$ and $\theta_{0,2}$, the two particles are ready to travel the billiard. Before starting to generate the individuals, we let the particles circulate and hit the billiard's wall until the e^{th} collision, we get $(x_k^0, y_k^0, \theta_k^0) = f^e(x_{0,k}, y_{0,k}, \theta_{0,k})$ for $k = 1, 2$ where e ($0 \leq e \leq 255$) is determined from the last 8 bits of the password $Pw = (p_{L-1} \dots p_2 p_1 p_0)_2$ such as:

$$e = \sum_{i=0}^7 p_i \times 2^i$$

At every step i ($i \geq 1$), we carry out $(n_i + 1)$ collisions for both particles with n_i ($0 \leq n_i \leq 3$) is determined by 2 bits taken directly from the password Pw as follows:

$$n_i = 2 \times p_{j+1} + p_j$$

where

$$j = 2 \times i \text{mod}(L - 1).$$

After $(n_i + 1)$ collisions, New coordinates are obtained $(x_k^i, y_k^i, \theta_k^i) = f^{n_i+1}(x_k^{i-1}, y_k^{i-1}, \theta_k^{i-1})$. We are interested in the collision coordinates with the square border of the billiard (i.e $|x_k^i| = a$ and $|y_k^i| = a$) ignoring the collisions




Figure 2: an operation step of our PRNG

with circle. If $A_k^i \in \Gamma_5$ (i.e. $(x_k^i)^2 + (y_k^i)^2 = r^2$), we go to the next collision point for k^{th} particle $(x_k^i, y_k^i, \theta_k^i) \leftarrow f^{n_i+2}(x_k^{i-1}, y_k^{i-1}, \theta_k^{i-1})$, and then two individuals are generated values:

$$E(x_k^i, y_k^i) = \begin{cases} \left[\frac{2^{32} x_k^i}{a} \right] & \text{if } x_k^i \geq 0 \text{ and } |y_k^i| = a \\ \left[2^{32} \left(1 + \frac{x_k^i}{a} \right) \right] & \text{if } x_k^i < 0 \text{ and } |y_k^i| = a \\ \left[\frac{2^{32} y_k^i}{a} \right] & \text{if } y_k^i \geq 0 \text{ and } |x_k^i| = a \\ \left[2^{32} \left(1 + \frac{y_k^i}{a} \right) \right] & \text{if } y_k^i < 0 \text{ and } |x_k^i| = a \end{cases}$$

$$= I_{i,k} = (b_{31}^{i,k} b_{30}^{i,k} \dots b_1^{i,k} b_0^{i,k})_2$$

The output S of the PRNG is the concatenation of the sub-sequences $S_1, S_2, \dots, S_i \dots$ then:

$$S = S_1 S_2 \dots S_i \dots,$$

with

$$S_i = I_{i,1} \oplus I_{i,2},$$

where $I_{i,1}$ and $I_{i,2}$ two individuals are generated at the i^{th} step.

The algorithm have two input parameters, a password Pw and an integer N which indicates the length of the requested binary sequence as shown in (Algorithm 2).

4 Security Analysis

A PRNG should verify security properties to resist the attacks. The security analysis must be done with care to

Algorithm 2 Generation the random suit RS

- 1: Begin
- 2: $\theta_1, \theta_2 \leftarrow \text{Initialize}(Pw)$
- 3: $(x_1, y_1) \leftarrow (0, \frac{3}{2}a)$
- 4: $(x_2, y_2) \leftarrow (0, -\frac{3}{2}a)$
- 5: $e \leftarrow p_0$
- 6: **for** $i = 1$ to 7 **do**
- 7: $e \leftarrow e + p_i \times 2^i$
- 8: **end for**
- 9: $(x_1, y_1, \theta_1) \leftarrow f^e(x_1, y_1, \theta_1)$
- 10: $(x_2, y_2, \theta_2) \leftarrow f^e(x_2, y_2, \theta_2)$
- 11: $I_{0,1} \leftarrow p_1$
- 12: $I_{0,2} \leftarrow p_{L-2}$
- 13: $i \leftarrow 1$
- 14: $j \leftarrow i \bmod (L - 1)$
- 15: $n \leftarrow 2 \times p_{j+1} + p_j$
- 16: $l \leftarrow 0$
- 17: **while** $l < \left\lceil \frac{N}{32} \right\rceil$ **do**
- 18: $(x_1, y_1, \theta_1) \leftarrow f^{n+1}(x_1, y_1, \theta_1)$
- 19: $(x_2, y_2, \theta_2) \leftarrow f^{n+1}(x_2, y_2, \theta_2)$
- 20: **if** $(x_1)^2 + (y_1)^2 = r^2$ **then**
- 21: $(x_1, y_1, \theta_1) \leftarrow f(x_1, y_1, \theta_1)$
- 22: **end if**
- 23: **if** $(x_2)^2 + (y_2)^2 = r^2$ **then**
- 24: $(x_2, y_2, \theta_2) \leftarrow f(x_2, y_2, \theta_2)$
- 25: **end if**
- 26: $I_1 \leftarrow E(x_1, y_1)$
- 27: $I_2 \leftarrow E(x_2, y_2)$
- 28: $RS \leftarrow RS || (I_1 \oplus I_2)$
- 29: $l \leftarrow l + 1$
- 30: $i \leftarrow i + 1$
- 31: $j \leftarrow 2 \times i \bmod (L - 1)$
- 32: **end while**
- 33: End

assess the quality of the sequences. We study in the following paragraphs, the key space size, sensitivity to initial conditions and the level of randomness of the sequences. In the following study we fixed r at $\frac{a}{2}$.

4.1 The Key Space

The size of the key space is among the criteria by which a crypto-systems to be robust, a large size makes brute force attacks infeasible. Our algorithm has as an initialization key, a binary string of any size as mentioned above. The two particles billiards need exactly 128 bits to calculate its initial orientations. These 128 bits are extracted via a pointer that traverses the password Pw . This leads us to say that the size of the key space is large enough to be attacked exhaustively.




Figure 3: The proportion $\frac{DH(S^0, S^i)}{N}$

4.2 Sensitivity to Key

The sensitivity to a small change in the key is one of the essential properties for a PRNG. In other words, a small difference in the seeds of the system should cause a big change in the pseudo-random sequences. This property makes the generator highly secured against statistics and differential attacks, and so the sequence can not be broken even if there is a small difference between the keys. In our case, the generator is based on two dynamic systems of a purely chaotic billiard [12, 26]. In fact, to analyze the chaotic behavior of our generator, we place several k_i keys in the input of the generator with a bit of difference between it. A pseudo-random sequences S^i of size $N = 10^6$ are generated. The Hamming distance between two binary sequences $S^i = x_{1,i} x_{2,i} \dots x_{N,i}$ and $S^j = x_{1,j} x_{2,j} \dots x_{N,j}$ of equal length N is the number $DH(S^i, S^j) = \text{card}\{d / x_{d,i} \neq x_{d,j}\}$. Thus, for the two binary sequences S_i and S_j , the Hamming distance is given by:

$$DH(S^i, S^j) = \sum_{t=1}^N x_{t,i} \oplus y_{t,i}$$

In the case where the generator is chaotic, this distance is generally ranges around $\frac{N}{2}$, witch gives $\frac{DH(S^i, S^j)}{N}$ is approximately 0.5 for each pair of sequences produced.

We generate a group of pseudo-random sequences $\{S^i\}_{0 \leq i \leq 64}$ using the keys $\{k_i\}_{0 \leq i \leq 64}$. the key $k_0 = \text{"GUENNOUN"}$, its binary representation in ASCII code is $k_0 = (01000111 01000101 010011100100111 01001111 01010101 01001110)_2$. The other 64 keys $\{k_i\}_{1 \leq i \leq 64}$ are derived from k_0 , by changing the i^{th} bit among the 64 bits of k_0 to find k_i . The value $\frac{DH(S^0, S^i)}{N}$ between the sequences is shown in the graph 3.

From the results obtained, the differences in proportions between the sequences are approximately 0.5, indicating that the proposed generator is highly sensitive to initial conditions. Sensitivity to a small perturbation in the key for our generator is due to two reasons:

- 1) The generator is based in its construction on a system of a chaotic billiard, so the generated sequences inherit the chaos and unpredictability of the billiard. A number additional of iterations extracted directly from the password allows the generator to benefit maximally of the chaos offered by the billiard;
- 2) The initialization angles are taken from the Pw , using a pointer that points to different positions until the its total cover. Indeed, a difference in a bit between two keys may cause a different orientation to the particles and thus to the generated sequences.

Sinai billiard is chaotic for all values of the radius r , but there is a difference in the chaos level for each value of r as shown in [12] where the Lyapunov exponent is expressed in terms of r . Therefore, the user can control the level of the chaos generator by an input parameter at the algorithm (r , where $0 < r < \frac{3}{2}a$).

In the next section, we examine the randomness of the generator by statistical tests NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology), which are considered the most valued.

4.3 Statistical Tests

The NIST Statistical Test Suite [24] is a statistical package, the result of collaboration between the statistical Engineering Division (SED) at NIST and the Computer Security Division. This suite consists of 16 tests, developed to quantify and assess the degree of random binary sequences produced by cryptographic generators. For each statistical test, a P_{value} is calculated from the bit sequence. This P_{value} is compared to a predefined threshold α , which is also called significance level. If P_{value} is greater than α , then the sequence is considered to be random with $1 - \alpha$ confidence level, and it proceeds the statistical test successfully, otherwise the sequence does not appear random. Generally, as suggested by NIST, α is set to its default value of 0.01, it indicates that one would expect 1 sequence in 100 sequences to be rejected.

To test our PRNG and as recommended by the NIST, we generated 1000 sequences, the length of each sequence is 1000^6 from a randomly selected keys. The test results on the sequences are presented in Table 2.

The minimum pass rate for the test Random Excursions (Variant) is approximately 609 for a sample of 625 binary sequences. The minimum pass rate for other tests is approximately 980 for a sample of 1000 binary sequences. We can see that the number of sequences that have managed to pass each test is greater than the minimum rate. Therefore, the proposed generator passed all NIST statistical tests. We can conclude that the numbers generated by the PRNG are random.

Table 2: Results of testing our generator on NIST test suite

Test Name	The P_{value}	The proportion	Result
<i>Frequency</i>	0.695200	992/1000	Success
<i>Block-Frequency</i>	0.861264	990/1000	Success
<i>Cumulative Sums (1)</i>	0.169981	995/1000	Success
<i>Cumulative Sums (2)</i>	0.978072	991/1000	Success
<i>Runs</i>	0.542228	985/1000	Success
<i>Longest Run</i>	0.709558	985/1000	Success
<i>Rank</i>	0.169981	995/1000	Success
<i>FFT</i>	0.080027	984/1000	Success
<i>Non-Overlapping</i>	0.505854	987/1000	Success
<i>Overlapping</i>	0.041169	991/1000	Success
<i>Universal</i>	0.334538	991/1000	Success
<i>Approximate Entropy</i>	0.851383	989/1000	Success
<i>Random Excursions</i>	0.478175	616/625	Success
<i>Random Excursions Variant</i>	0.470796	616/625	Success
<i>Serial (1)</i>	0.919131	986/1000	Success
<i>Serial (2)</i>	0.334538	980/1000	Success
<i>Linear Complexity</i>	0.948298	992/1000	Success

5 Conclusion

The PRNG proposed after a rigorous analysis, showed encouraging results, it is sensitive to a small change in the key and passed the NIST statistical test suite. Our generator has inherited the Sinai billiard unpredictability. It can be used for critical cryptographic applications. Furthermore, the systems of the chaotic billiards are good candidates to get into new cryptographic system design.

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